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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES FLOYD, ] 
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WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, ] 
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR., ] 
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D., ] 
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, ] 
Respondents. ] 
| BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
| Supreme Court No. 870284 
I Priority Class 14-B 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court acted properly in 
dismissing appellant's claim because of appellant's failure to 
comply with the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953 as amended) 
states in pertinent part as follows: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider 
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first 
occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall 
apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under 
section 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, issued an 
Order on July 20, 1987, granting Summary Judgment in favor 
of the respondents and finding as follows: 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff 
discovered or through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered 
that he had sustained an injury and that 
the injury was caused by negligent action 
more than two years before he commenced an 
action against the health care providers; 
consequently, his claims of medical 
malpractice are barred by the statute of 
limitations prescribed in Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 
(1953 as amended). 
(R. 186-88). 
Following the court's issuing of the above Order, 
this appeal was taken. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises from a claim of medical 
malpractice made against Dr. Lindem for surgery performed 
on Charles Floyd (hereinafter "appellant") on December 10, 
1981. Appellant alleges that Dr. Lindem1s surgery was 
unauthorized and performed without appellant's knowledge of the 
risks involved. 
Appellant experienced unexpected discomfort 
immediately following the surgery. Because of continued 
problems following that surgery, on or about March or April of 
1982, appellant met with Dr. Lindem and discovered that the 
surgery performed in December of 1981 involved procedures that 
were not requested and that appellant did not desire to be 
performed. Appellant knew at that time that the discomfort he 
suffered was a result of this unauthorized surgery. 
Appellant served his Notice of Intent to Commence 
Litigation on November 27, 1985. This notice was served long 
after the two-year statute of limitations for bringing a 
medical malpractice claim, since appellant discovered his 
injuries on or before March or April of 1982. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent contends that the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations bars appellant's action in this 
case. By April of 1982, appellant was informed that 
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Dr. Lindem had performed allegedly unauthorized surgery upon 
him and that the symptoms appellant was suffering resulted from 
that surgery. Therefore, by April 1982, appellant was aware of 
his injury, its alleged cause and the party who allegedly 
caused the injury. Such knowledge was clearly sufficient to 
lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause 
of action against the health care provider. Accordingly, 
appellant had enough information to commence the running of the 
statute of limitations. That statute of limitations ran in 
April of 1984 and appellant's Notice of Intent to Commence 
Litigation was filed nineteen months after the running of the 
statute. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPROPRIATE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In his brief, appellant properly points out that this 
Court must evaluate all evidence used by the trial court in 
reaching its summary judgment determination in the light most 
favorable to the appellant. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. 
Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). However, even applying this 
standard of review, appellant's claims against the respondents 
are clearly barred by Utah's two-year medical malpractice 
statute of limitations. 
Utah law requires that a malpractice action against a 
health care provider be brought within two years after 
appellant discovers or reasonably should have discovered the 
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injury. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953 as amended) of the 
Health Care Malpractice Act states in part as follows: 
(1) No malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought unless 
it is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence . . . . 
This discovery rule is discussed further in Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). In Foil, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that: 
the two-year provision does not commence to 
run until the injured person knew or should 
have known that he had sustained an injury 
and that the injury was caused by negligent 
action. 
Id. at 148. Apply the unequivocal language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953 as amended), especially in light of its 
application in Foil, there can be not question that 
appellant's claims against respondents are barred by the 
running of the two-year statute of limitations. 
From the testimony at appellant's deposition, 
appellant learned shortly after the operation that the surgery 
performed on him was more extensive than he had authorized. 
Appellant claimed that the operation performed on him was to 
repair a hiatal hernia by repairing a tear between the 
esophagus and the stomach. No mention was made of any 
additional procedures to correct other problems. (R. 199: 
Appellant's Depo., p. 83, lines 16-22.) 
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Within three or four months after appellant's 
surgery, appellant stated he began to suffer symptoms of 
diarrhea, pain in his stomach, gradual weight loss and 
depression. (R. 199: Appellant's Depo., p. 95, lines 5-24.) 
Upon appellant's discussion of these unexpected symptoms with 
his treating physician, appellant was informed that additional 
surgery has been performed on his stomach besides the surgery 
on his hiatal hernia. Appellant was told that extensive 
surgery had been performed on his stomach to treat gastric 
ulcer disease. Appellant was well aware at the time of this 
discussion that he had never discussed such surgery with his 
treating physician prior to the December 1981 operation and 
that he had not consented to such surgery. (R. 199: 
Appellant's Depo., p. 97, lines 2-18.) 
Appellant also had further notice in September of 
1982 that the surgery performed by Dr. Lindem was more 
extensive than simply repairing his hiatal hernia. In 
September of 1982, Dr. Wilcox contacted Dr. Lindem's office 
and received information concerning the extensive nature of 
appellant's surgery. Dr. Wilcox told appellant of this 
conversation at Dr. Lindem's office and advised appellant 
that he may have additional complications as a result of this 
extended surgery on appellant. (R. 199: Appellant's Depo., 
pp. 99-100, lines 14-25, 1.) The above statements from 
appellant's deposition clearly indicate that appellant knew or 
should have known he had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by a negligent action. Accordingly, the 
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lower court properly ruled that appellant's claims against 
respondents are barred by Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4 (1953 as 
amended). 
A number of recent opinions have addressed similar 
statutes of limitations. For example, in Hargett v. 
Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (Utah 1984), rev'd on other 
grounds, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986), the Court, in 
interpreting Utah's medical malpractice statute, stated that: 
The crucial guestion is whether the 
plaintiff was aware of the facts that would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude that 
he may have a cause of action against a 
health care provider. Those facts include 
the existence of an injury, its cause and 
the possibility of negligence. 
In another case, Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th 
Cir. 1986), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Utah District Court 
ruling barring the plaintiff's claims due to the two-year 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1(1). The 
court in Magoc held as follows: 
Plaintiff's counsel argues that [plaintiff 
did not] know the full extent of 
defendants' negligence, which was only 
learned later. The district court rejected 
his argument, as do we. To adopt such 
reasoning would, in practical effect, wipe 
out the statute. 
Id. at 379. Therefore, in accordance with the Hargett 
and Magoc rationale outlined above, even if a potential 
plaintiff does not understand the "full extent of a defendant's 
negligence," the limitation period will commence to run. As 
indicated in appellant's deposition, appellant was aware of 
facts sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that 
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he may have a cause of action against the health care provider 
when he learned in April of 1982 that Dr. Lindem had 
allegedly performed unauthorized surgery and that the symptoms 
he was suffering from were a result at that surgery. Appellant 
was aware of "an injury,11 its "cause," and the "possibility of 
negligence." Despite appellant's contention that he did not 
know "the full extent of the respondents' negligence," 
appellant had sufficient information to commence the running of 
the statute of limitations. Appellant's Notice of Intent to 
Commence Litigation against respondents is dated November 27, 
1985, and clearly was not filed within the two-year statute of 
limitations after appellant's discovery of this unauthorized 
surgery as noted above. 
Respondent's position is further supported by the 
case of Miller v. A.H. Robins, Co., 766 F.2d 1102 (7th 
Cir. 1985). The Miller case involved a similar two-year 
statute of limitations for appellant to bring a malpractice 
action against a physician. In Miller, appellant had a 
Dalcon shield inserted in her uterus in 1972. In 1974, 
appellant was treated for a pelvic infection and the Dalcon 
shield was removed. Despite the court recognizing that various 
affidavits were submitted by treating physicians indicating 
those physicians had no recollection of advising appellant that 
her problems in 1974 were related to her use of the Dalcon 
shield, appellant's own testimony that her treating physicians 
told her in 1974 that the Dalcon shield was a possible cause 
of her illness was sufficient for the court to commence running 
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of the applicable discovery statute• Therefore, appellant's 
suit filed in 1981 after appellant discovered that the damage 
from the Dalcon shield caused her infertility was clearly 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1106. 
By applying the court's rationale in Miller to the 
case at bar, appellant's own testimony in his deposition that 
his treating physicians admitted to him on or before September 
of 1982 that additional surgery had been performed on him which 
was not consented to by appellant was sufficient to commence 
the running of the statute. Appellant's affidavit submitted 
with his brief is not sufficient to counteract the reality that 
appellant did in fact know more than two years prior to his 
filing his Notice of Claim against respondents that 
unauthorized surgery had been performed on him and that the 
discomfort and complications he was feeling were a result of 
that unauthorized surgery. Appellant has submitted no evidence 
to indicate that his testimony at the time of the deposition 
was inaccurate or that he misunderstood the substance of those 
questions. Without such evidence, the Court can only conclude 
that appellant's deposition testimony taken under oath was a 
clear and truthful rendition of the facts as the appellant 
understood them. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE PERMANENT NATURE OF HIS 
INJURIES WERE CONCEALED BY RESPONDENTS IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY APPELLANT'S DEPOSITION OR THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Appellant has alleged that the health care providers 
in this case fraudulently concealed their alleged negligent 
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actions. The Utah legislature has codified the law concerning 
fraudulent concealment in medical malpractice cases. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1)(b) reads as follows: 
In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
this conduct on the part of the health care 
provider because that health care provider 
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the appellant or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered, the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever occurs 
first. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A claim for medical malpractice which has been 
fraudulently concealed by a health care provider must be 
brought within one year after the patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever occurs first. In accordance 
with appellant's own testimony, appellant was aware of the 
unauthorized surgery performed on him and the unexpected 
adverse symptoms he was suffering as a result of that surgery 
on or before September of 1982. Therefore, from September of 
1982, appellant cannot realistically allege that his treating 
physicians were continuing to fraudulently conceal the cause of 
his adverse condition. Appellant had knowledge that surgery he 
had not authorized was the cause of his unexpected suffering 
and this knowledge would give a man of reasonable diligence, 
albeit only a high school graduate, notice of misconduct on the 
part of his health care providers sufficient to commence the 
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running of this one-year statute of limitations for fraudulent 
concealment as described above. 
In light of the above-described one-year statute of 
limitations and the previously discussed two-year statute of 
limitations, appellant's Notice of Claim filed in November of 
1982, over three years after discovering the unauthorized 
surgery and its accompanying symptoms, is clearly barred by any 
statute of limitations that could be applied in this case. 
POINT III 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN THE UTAH 
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT HAS BEEN DECLARED 
CONSTITUTIONAL BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Appellant's Brief goes through an extensive argument 
alleging that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act violates 
the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States. Not only is this claim by appellants barred because it 
was not argued previously in the hearing on respondents' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., Inc., 
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984)), but also Utah case law clearly 
supports the constitutionality of the statutes of limitations 
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. In Allen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), 
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such a 
statute of limitations and specifically stated that "the 
limitations statute is not constitutionally defective as a 
'special law.'" Id. at 32. The Allen case is still good 
law in Utah. Therefore, appellant's claim that the statute of 
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limitations applied in this case is unconstitutional has no 
merit under applicable Utah law. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-14-1(1)(b) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3). 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(1)(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) are 
conflicting. While both statutes have differing limitations 
for bringing an action based on fraud, the language of the two 
statutes are not inconsistent. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) 
states in part as follows: 
The provisions of this section shall apply 
to all persons, regardless of minority or 
other legal disability under Section 
78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law. 
(Emphasis added.) This portion of the statute clearly 
indicates that the legislature intended for every provision of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 to apply in medical malpractice 
cases despite the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-26(3). 
Appellants contend that a 1979 amendment to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) added the language "notwithstanding the 
provisions of § 78-12-26" and thus created an ambiguity in the 
law. A thorough perusal of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) 
reveals no mention of the language "notwithstanding the 
provisions of § 78-12-26." In any event, the legislature has 
not been inconsistent in its enactment of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act and Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 specifically 
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states that the provisions in that section are to apply despite 
the presence of "any other provision of the law." 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL TO THE SYMPATHY OF THE COURT IS 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
The Utah legislature has numerous public policy 
considerations to make when enacting a special statute of 
limitations as in this case. Appellant's attempt in his brief 
to appeal to the sympathy of the Court by contrasting the 
apparent financial disparity between the appellant and 
respondents is only valid to the extent such sympathy 
agreements are in harmony with the applicable Utah statutory 
and case law concerning this issue. Appellant can cite no Utah 
statute or Utah case supporting his position. In fact, the 
Utah legislature specifically outlined the purpose of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1953 
as amended) by stating in pertinent part as follows: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of 
the legislature to provide a reasonable 
time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while 
limiting that time to a specific period for 
which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated and to provide other procedural 
charges to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
Even viewing the record below in the light most 
favorable to the appellant, this Court should conclude that the 
trial court properly applied Utah's two-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations to appellant's claims. 
Based on appellant's own testimony in his deposition, the court 
determined that reasonable minds could not disagree that 
appellant knew of his alleged injury more than two years prior 
to filing his claims against respondents. The trial court 
correctly ruled that under the reasonableness test outlined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953 as amended), appellant had not 
met either the one-year or two-year statute of limitations as 
it pertains to his cause of action against respondents. No 
Utah case law exists which is contrary to the above-referenced 
statute and no case law exists which would declare this statute 
unconstitutional. Also, appellant's appeal to the Court for 
sympathy by comparing the various parties' financial strength 
has no support in the statutory or case law of Utah. Such 
considerations were taken in account when the legislature 
passed this special statute of limitations. 
Therefore, appellant's arguments all fail in this 
case and respondents respectfully urged this court to rule that 
the District Court acted properly in granting Summary Judgment 
in favor of respondents. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2^_ day of March, 1988. 
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BRUCE R. GARNER 
LLOYD A. HARDCASTLE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
St. Mark's Hospital 
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